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Eighteen-month-olds’ memory
interference and distraction in a
modified A-not-B task is not
associated with their anticipatory
looking in a false-belief task
Norbert Zmyj1*, Wolfgang Prinz2* and Moritz M. Daum3
1 Technical University of Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany, 2 Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences,
Leipzig, Germany, 3 University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks is often interpreted as if
they have understood false beliefs. This view has been questioned by a recent
account that explains infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks as the
result of susceptibility to memory interference and distraction. We tested this
alternative account by investigating the relationship between infants’ false-belief
understanding, susceptibility to memory interference and distraction, and general
cognitive development in 18-month-old infants (N = 22). False-belief understanding was
tested in an anticipatory looking paradigm of a standard false-belief task. Susceptibility
to memory interference and distraction was tested in a modified A-not-B task. Cognitive
development was measured via the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant
Development. We did not find any relationship between infants’ performance in the
false-belief task and the A-not-B task, even after controlling for cognitive development.
This study shows that there is no ubiquitous relation between susceptibility to memory
interference and distraction and performance in a false-belief task in infancy.
Keywords: false belief task, memory interference, infancy, distraction, inhibitory control
Introduction
The proposal that infants are able to understand other agents’ false beliefs has been a source of lively
debate over the last decade (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Ruﬀman and Perner, 2005; Heyes, 2014;
Scott and Baillargeon, 2014). In traditional false-belief tasks, children explicitly reason about an
agent’s future behavior based on the agent’s false belief, which is indicated by the children’s verbal
response (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). In the seminal “Maxi” task, Maxi puts the chocolate in the
blue cupboard and leaves the room. While he is away, his mother enters the room and puts the
chocolate in the green cupboard. Children are asked where Maxi will look for his chocolate after
his return. Children demonstrate their false-belief understanding by indicating that Maxi will look
for the chocolate in the blue cupboard. At around 4 years of age, children pass this type of task
(Wellman et al., 2001).
The idea that children do not understand false beliefs before the age of 4 has been
challenged by studies reporting that infants and toddlers are able to pass false-belief tasks if
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one uses tasks in which children react spontaneously and are
not asked questions (see Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005, for the
starting point of this debate). In an anticipatory looking task
(Southgate et al., 2007), toddlers observed a hand puppet placing
a ball in one of two boxes and an observing agent subsequently
retrieving the ball in two familiarization trials. In order to reach
into the box, the agent had to open one of two windows in a
barrier. Each window was directly above the corresponding box.
In a subsequent belief-induction trial, two diﬀerent conditions
were administered. The hand puppet placed the ball in the ﬁrst
box, which was observed by the agent in both conditions. Then,
the hand puppet transferred the ball to the second box, which
was observed by the agent in only one condition. Finally, the
hand puppet took the ball out of the second box, which was
not observed by the agent in both conditions. Accordingly, the
agent held two diﬀerent false beliefs regarding the location of the
ball. Before the agent reached into one of the boxes, the toddlers’
eye gaze was measured. The majority of toddlers anticipated
that the agent would reach for the ball in the location where
she believed it to be. This type of task has also been employed
with 18-month-olds (Thoermer et al., 2012). Although, here, the
mean looking times revealed that infants did not look longer at
the window that indicated false-belief understanding than at the
other window, infants who did look longer at the correct window
were more likely to pass standard false-belief tasks at 4 years
of age. These ﬁndings of toddlers’ false-belief understanding are
especially informative because action prediction is often seen as
being more cognitively demanding than an evaluation of past
behavior (Gredebäck and Melinder, 2010; Daum et al., 2012;
Verschoor et al., 2013).
Thementalistic interpretation of infants’ performance in false-
belief tasks has been controversial from the outset (e.g., Ruﬀman
and Perner, 2005). However, the criticism only extended to
single paradigms that reported evidence of infants’ false-belief
understanding. Recently, this criticism has been articulated more
comprehensively (Heyes, 2014). According to this view, young
children’s performance in false-belief tasks is susceptible to low-
level explanations for the following reasons: First, infants look
longer at situations which they perceive to be novel (Olson
and Sherman, 1983). For example, in Onishi and Baillargeon’s
(2005) study, the agent reached into a green box, where she had
not seen the object being transferred. Infants’ looking time was
longer in this trial than in a trial in which the agent reached
into a yellow box, where she had last seen the objects. Instead
of attributing beliefs, infants might simply react to the novelty
of the combination of person, place of the object, and reaching
action. Second, infants’ memory might be aﬀected by retroactive
interference: If two events occur one after another, the memory
of the latter event might interfere with the memory of the former.
For example, an agent witnesses an object being placed into box
A and then leaves the scene. The object is then transferred to box
B before the agent reappears. The subsequent reappearance of
the agent interferes retroactively with the memory of the transfer
of the object into box B. Thus, infants might themselves believe
that the object is in box A and expect the agent to look at box
A. Third, disruptive elements of false-belief tasks might distract
infants’ attention and therefore their memory.
The same argument might be applied to false-belief studies
using anticipatory looking tasks. The ringing sound in Southgate
et al.’s (2007) study, for example, might have distracted infants
when the ball was being transferred from the ﬁrst box to the
second box (for the role distraction in imitation tasks, see Beisert
et al., 2012). The agent’s head turn toward the boxes after the
ball has been transferred might interfere retroactively with the
memory of the transfer of the ball. Both processes would lead to
the infants’ belief that the ball was still in the ﬁrst box. Likewise, a
deﬁcit in working memory is fundamental to the A-not-B task
because infants still look for a toy at location A even though
they have observed the experimenter hiding the toy at location
B. Although infants at the end of the ﬁrst year of life master this
task in the standard version, they fail if a delay is introduced
between the hiding of the toy and the searching for the toy
at location B (Diamond, 1985). Both proactive and retroactive
interference might lead to this error. The repeated successful
retrieval of the toy at location A might interfere proactively with
the memory of the new location of the toy at B. Additionally,
the delay between hiding the toy and searching for the toy might
interfere retroactively with the memory that the toy is at location
B. Thus, if a deﬁcit in working memory is responsible for infants’
seemingly successful performance in a false-belief task, then we
would expect that infants who fail in the A-not-B task in the B
trials will succeed in the false-belief task.
In the present study, we therefore tested whether infants’
working memory is related to their performance in a false-belief
task. We used an analogous version of Southgate et al.’s (2007)
false-belief task and analyzed infants’ anticipatory looking via
eye tracking. According to our knowledge, there are two infant
studies suggesting that infants acknowledge the actors’ mental
states in analogous videos. First, in Southgate et al.’s (2007) study,
the majority of 25-month-olds anticipated that the actor directs
her action to the box where she has last seen the object. Second,
in Thoermer et al.’s (2012) study, 18-month-old performed at
chance level in this task, but a correct anticipation at 18 months
of age predicted passing the standard change-of-location task at
48 months of age. Another study with adult participants showed
that adults with Asperger syndrome anticipated less reliably the
reach of the actor according to her belief than adults without
Asperger syndrome (Senju et al., 2010). We aimed at testing
an age group with equal rates of passers and non-passers in
the false-belief task. Southgate et al. (2007) reported that 85%
of 25-month-old infants passed this test, while Thoermer et al.
(2012) reported that only 55% of 18-month-olds passed. We
opted to test 18-month-olds in order to increase the variance in
infants’ performance, which is essential when comparing it to the
performance in the A-not-B task.
A modiﬁed version of the A-not-B task was used in order to
test infants’ working memory (Diamond, 1985) and retroactive
interference (Heyes, 2014). After an object was hidden at one
location and before the infants could reach for an object, a delay
was introduced by putting a shield between the locations and the
infants. This delay was reported to test infants working memory.
For example, if landmarks indicate at which location a toy is
hidden (location A or B), then infants do not err even after longer
delays (Diamond, 1983). Additionally, lesions in the dorsolateral
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prefrontal cortex of macaques (Diamond and Goldman-Rakic,
1989) negatively aﬀects their performance in the delayed A-not-B
task and this region is typically associated with higher executive
functions such as working memory (Stern et al., 2001). The delay
is also believed to introduce retroactive interference: Putting the
shield between the infant and the hidden object weakens the
memory for the event that happened before, namely, the object
being hidden at one location (Heyes, 2014).We further controlled
for infants’ cognitive development by employing the Mental Scale
of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID-II).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were 22 eighteen-month-olds (M = 18 months;
2 days, SD = 0;08; age range: 17;14–18;15, 14 girls). Thirty-
nine additional infants were tested but excluded from the ﬁnal
sample due to fussiness and lack of interest during the false-
belief task (n = 15), the A-not-B task (n = 9), or the Mental
Scale of the BSID-II (n = 2). Further reasons were procedural
errors (n = 6), failing to meet the inclusion criterion in the
false-belief task (n = 4), interference by the parent (n = 1), or
equipment failure (n = 1). Although the attrition rate is high,
it is analogous to similar studies on false-belief understanding
in this age range (e.g., Southgate et al., 2007; Buttelmann et al.,
2009). The experiment was conducted in accordance with the
ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki and
the standards of the local ethics committee of the University of
Leipzig.
Material
The false-belief task was presented and gaze was measured using
a Tobii 1750 near infrared eye tracker with an infant add-on
(precision: 1◦, accuracy: 0.5◦, sampling rate: 50 Hz). A 9-point
infant calibration was used. Viewing distance was approximately
80 cm. In the A-not-B task, a wooden panel (40 cm × 10 cm) and
two plastic cups were used. An upright board (height = 25 cm,
width = 45 cm) obscured infants’ view of the cups. A maximum
of sixteen cubes (3 cm × 3 cm × 3 cm) could be retrieved by
the infants and put into a xylophone box, resulting in a series of
tones.
Design
All infants were tested in three tasks: the false-belief task, the
A-not-B task, and the BSID-II. The order of the false-belief task
and the A-not-B task was counterbalanced and the BSID-II was
conducted last.
Procedure
False-Belief Task
In the false-belief task, infants viewed videos, which presented
two familiarization trials and one test trial. In all videos, an actor
sat behind a board that contained a left and a right window. He
wore a white visor cap and moved his head as if he were following
the displayed actions closely in order to increase the impression
that he was being attentive. Infants also watched a second similar
video, which was presented before or after the false-belief task.
However, this video was beyond the scope of the present research
question and is not reported here.
The task was analogous to Southgate et al.’s (2007) false-
belief II task: An opaque box was placed in front of each of
the two windows described above. In the familiarization trials
(see Figure 1A), the actor witnessed a ball being hidden by
a human hand (henceforth called “operating hand”) in one of
the two boxes. The duration of this sequence was 10 s. Then,
in an anticipation phase, which was similar across trials and
tasks, a chime sounded and a still image was presented, with
both windows ﬁrst being illuminated (1,000 ms) and then not
illuminated (1,750 ms). During the anticipation phase it was
measured whether infants ﬁxated the two windows. Each area
of interest was 7.55 cm × 5.44 cm (height × width) which
equals a visual angle of 5.4◦ × 3.9◦. The actor then reached
through the window on the side where the ball was located and
opened the box (duration = 6 s). In the test trial (Figure 1B),
the ball was again hidden in one box (duration = 10 s). Then,
a telephone started ringing and the actor turned around. While
he was looking away, the operating hand transferred the ball
from one box to the other and after that, removed the ball from
the second box (duration = 30 s). Then, the telephone stopped
ringing, and the actor turned back and the next anticipation phase
started.
We only analyzed infants’ looking behavior in the test trial
if infants met the inclusion criterion applied by Thoermer et al.
(2012). Infants’ looking time to the correct window had to be
FIGURE 1 | Successive frames from the videos of one of the
familiarization trials (A) and the test trial (B) for the change-of-location
task.
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longer than infants’ looking time to the incorrect window in at
least one familiarization trial. It should be noted that the same
pattern of result showed when we used the inclusion criterion
(i.e., toddlers had to direct their ﬁrst ﬁxation in the second
familiarization trial to the correct window) applied by Southgate
et al. (2007).
A-not-B Task and BSID
A modiﬁed version of the A-not-B task was designed for
18-month-olds (Diamond, 1985). Infants sat on their parents’ lap
facing the experimenter who sat at the opposite side of table.
The experimenter hid a small cube under one of two cups.
He then hid the cups behind the occluder for 5 s and ﬁnally
placed them within the infants’ reach. If the infants successfully
retrieved the cube, they could put it in the xylophone box. After
four successful retrievals from location A, the hiding place was
switched to location B. The experiment endedwhen infants found
the cube at location B. Finally, infants’ cognitive development was
assessed using the Mental Scale of the BSID (2nd edition, Bayley,
1993).
Coding and Reliability
In the false-belief task, infants’ looking behavior was analyzed for
2,750 ms after the anticipation phase began. The ﬁrst ﬁxation
on one of the two windows lasting more than 200 ms was
identiﬁed and categorized as (a) anticipatory ﬁxation that was
congruent with the actor’s false belief, resulting in a score of
1, or (b) anticipatory ﬁxation that was incongruent with the
actor’s false belief, resulting in a score of 0. Additionally, the
duration of all ﬁxations on both windows during the anticipation
phase was assessed and transformed into two sum scores (i.e.,
one sum score for each window). The proportion of mean
looking time at one window was calculated by dividing the
looking time at one window by the sum of looking times at both
windows.
In the A-not-B task, the coding began when infants had
retrieved the cube in four successive trials from location A and
the cube was hidden at location B. We counted the number of
trials in which infants searched at location A before they ﬁnally
searched at location B.
The reliability rating of the A-not-B task by a second
independent rater was excellent (r = 0.92, intraclass correlation
coeﬃcient). Infants’ performance in the BSID was analyzed
according to the standard procedure as described in the BSID
manual.
Results
False-Belief Task
Infants’ ﬁrst ﬁxation on the location that corresponded to the
actor’s false belief (7 out of 22 infants, M = 32%) did not diﬀer
from the chance level (p = 0.13, binomial test)1. Analyses of
the mean looking time of all ﬁxations on the ﬁrst box (where
1A similar result was obtained when applying the original coding criterion of
Southgate et al. (2007), who coded an anticipatory look to one location if the infant
ﬁxated on the AOI for more than 20 ms.
the agent has seen the ball being transferred) and the window
above and as well as the second box (where the agent has not
seen the ball being transferred) and the window above during
the anticipation phase of the test trial did not result in any
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect [Mﬁrst box = 533 ms, SD = 479 ms,
M second box = 913 ms, SD = 682 ms, t(21) = 1.77, p = 0.09]. The
infants’ ﬁrst anticipatory look to the side where the actor last saw
the ball and proportion of looking the side where the actor last
saw the ball correlated (r = 0.77, p < 0.001). Further analyses of
possible moderating variables such as mean looking time toward
the videos before the anticipation phase, referential looks toward
the actor’s head, and number of correct anticipatory looks during
the familiarization trials did not reveal any statistically signiﬁcant
ﬁndings.
A-not-B Task and BSID
The mean number of incorrect searches at location A was 1.4
(SD = 1.7, range 0–5). Nine infants did not perform an incorrect
search at location A, six infants searched at location A one time,
two infants each searched at location A two, four, and ﬁve times,
and one infants searched at location A three times. Infants’ mean
IQ score in the BSID was 93.3 (SD = 10.3, range 79–117). Four
infants received a score below 85, 17 infants received a score
within 85 and 115, and one infant received a score above 115.
In order to assess whether infants who were excluded performed
worse in the A-not-B task than infants who were included in
the study we compared their performance. We did not ﬁnd
a diﬀerence between both mean scores, M(excluded) = 1.4
(SD = 1.6), t < 1.
Relationship between Tasks
There was no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the
false-belief task and the A-not-B task for the toddlers’ ﬁrst ﬁxation
in the false-belief task (r = −0.02, p = 0.92, Spearman rank
correlation, see Figure 2 for group diﬀerences between infants
who anticipated correctly and incorrectly in the false-belief task)
or for the proportion of mean looking time of ﬁxations on
FIGURE 2 | Number of incorrect searches at location A in the A-not-B
task for infants whose first fixation in the false-belief task was
directed to the location where the actor last saw the ball (correct) and
whose first fixation was directed to the location where the actor did
not last see the ball (incorrect).
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the ﬁrst box – where the agent has seen the ball being placed
(r = 0.11, p = 0.63, Spearman rank correlation). This remained
after controlling for cognitive developmentmeasured in the BSID
(r = −0.06, p = 0.78; r = −0.15, p = 0.49, Spearman rank
correlation).
Discussion
The present study revealed no correlation between a non-verbal
false-belief task and a modiﬁed version of the A-not-B task.
The lack of correlation remained after controlling for infants’
cognitive development. Accordingly, the present study provided
no evidence for the assumption that a deﬁcit in working memory
is related to infants’ success in a non-verbal false-belief task
(Heyes, 2014). This null result is especially informative because
the scenario in the false-belief tasks was suggested to resemble
the A-not-B task (Heyes, 2014) and a considerable proportion of
infants failed in both tasks, which opened up the possibility that
performance in both tasks correlated.
The absence of evidence of a relationship between
performance in a working memory task and a false-belief
task is not evidence of the absence of this relationship.
Accordingly, this study does not straightforwardly refute the
proposal that low-level explanations apply to false-belief tasks
for infants. There are at least two possible explanations for the
lack of relationship between the two tasks in the present study.
A ﬁrst explanation is based on speciﬁc characteristics of the
tasks in this study, which might have reduced the correlation
between the false-belief task and the A-not-B task. The critical
variables might have been the infants’ age, the criterion for
anticipatory looking, and the stimuli used in the false-belief
task. Whereas in the original study, 25-month-olds were tested
(Southgate et al., 2007), we chose 18-month-olds in order to
obtain more variance in their anticipatory looking. Previous
ﬁndings have shown that 18-month-olds’ looking behavior is
not random in this task, but that the false-belief-like looking
pattern (i.e., gaze to the window according to the agent’s false
belief) is related to their explicit false-belief understanding at
the age of 4 years (Thoermer et al., 2012). Next, the criterion
for an anticipatory ﬁxation on one of the two windows was
that it lasted more than 200 ms. We used this criterion because
ﬁxations with shorter duration appeared to be random and not
directed to the window. However, when applying the original
criterion by Southgate et al. (2007) of more than 20 ms, the
correlation between the false-belief task and the A-not-B task
remained statistically not signiﬁcant. Additionally, although
we matched the stimuli closely to the original stimuli used in
Southgate et al.’s (2007) study, there were minor diﬀerences.
The agent in the present study was male, while the agent of the
Southgate et al. (2007) study was female. In the present study,
a human hand transferred the ball from one location to the
other, whereas in Southgate et al.’s (2007) study, a hand puppet
resembling a polar bear transferred the ball. However, we do
not think that these diﬀerences aﬀected the infants’ working
memory, and therefore do not believe them to be responsible for
the lack of correlation between performance in the false-belief
task and the A-not-B task. Finally, we tested infants’ false-belief
understanding in an anticipatory-looking task which represents
only one measure to test infants’ false-belief understanding. We
did not test infants’ false-belief understanding in a violation-
of-expectation task. There is a structural diﬀerence between
both tasks because in anticipatory-looking tasks infants have
to predict an agent’s action whereas in violation-of-expectation
tasks, infants have to evaluate an executed action. It remains an
open question whether working memory and distraction is the
key to understand infants’ performance in false-belief tasks in
violation-of-expectation tasks.
A second explanation is based on a mentalistic interpretation
of infants’ performance in the false-belief task. If infants do
attribute false beliefs to others, then it is not surprising that this
ability is not closely related to their working memory. Working
memory might be a prerequisite for remembering the story
line of a false-belief scenario. The mere memory, however, does
not imply insight into the mental states of others. This notion
was supported by a meta-analysis showing that early executive
functions predict later false-belief understanding but not vice
versa (Devine and Hughes, 2014).
The idea that young children are able to infer others’
mental states is thought-provoking and should be tested more
rigorously in the future. Improving the false-belief scenarios is
one strategy to test this question (Heyes, 2014). In the present
study, we used another strategy by correlating an established
false-belief task with the A-not-B task, which tests inhibitory
control and working memory. This strategy has been applied
in previous studies on the relationship between non-verbal
belief tasks and other tasks on inhibitory control, which were
identiﬁed as being closely related in standard verbal false-
belief tasks (for an overview, see Devine and Hughes, 2014).
These studies revealed mixed ﬁndings. Three- and 4-year-olds’
performance in the Dimensional Card Change Sorting task
and a non-verbal false-belief task showed no relationship (Low,
2010). In contrast, 18-month-olds’ performance in a detour task
(i.e., infants had to open a box with a transparent window
presenting a toy by touching a knob attached to the side of
the box) and a non-verbal false-belief task using a violation-of-
expectation paradigm did show a relationship (Yott and Poulin-
Dubois, 2012). The latter ﬁnding is surprising because non-
verbal false-belief tasks were designed to eliminate inhibitory
control demands (Baillargeon et al., 2010). However, we were
unable to ﬁnd this relationship between the A-not-B task and
a false-belief task in an unexpected transfer scenario. The
present ﬁndings might indicate that predictive eye gaze is less
aﬀected by infants’ inhibitory control than looking times in
violation-of-expectation paradigms. A possible reason could be
that predictive eye gaze is a more automatic response than
continuous looking to an event, and therefore predictive eye
gaze is less targeted by higher cognitive processes such as
inhibition. It is clear, however, that the relationship between
false-belief understanding in infancy and executive functions
including working memory and inhibitory control should be
further investigated.
The present study replicated Thoermer et al.’s (2012) ﬁnding
that 18-month-olds as a group do not perform above chance level
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when anticipating an agent’s action based on the agent’s false
belief. Southgate et al. (2007) demonstrated that the majority of
25-month-olds pass this test which shows that between 18 and
25 months of age infants develop the ability to anticipate others’
action based on the others’ false beliefs. The fact that children who
passed the false-belief test at 18 months of age were more likely
to pass a standard false-belief test at 48 months of age indicates
that infants at 18 months of age do not perform at random, but
that some 18-month-olds are sensitive to another’s false belief.
In the present study, we showed this successful performance
in 18-month-olds is not predicted by distraction or memory
interference as measured by the modiﬁed A-not-B task.
In sum, the present study revealed no relationship between
performance in a false-belief task using an anticipatory looking
paradigm and a modiﬁed version of the A-not-B task even after
controlling for cognitive development. Accordingly, this study
ﬁnds no evidence in support of a relationship between working
memory and false-belief understanding in infancy.
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